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Abstract
Policy options for stimulating real activity are limited once short-term interest rates have been driven
to zero. Monetary policy makers face the di¢ cult challenge of preventing or reversing declines in near-
term in￿ ation expectations while preserving con￿dence in the central bank￿ s commitment to long-term
price stability. Fiscal policy makers must commit to a credible plan for maintaining or raising near-term
government purchases while minimizing increases in future marginal tax rates.
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A
s of this writing (January 2011), the unemployment rate stands at 9.4 percent. The trimmed-mean
measure of trend personal consumption expenditure (PCE) in￿ ation has plunged by more than two-
thirds, from 2.8 percent to 0.9 percent, in a little over two years (from July 2008 to December 2010).1 PCE
in￿ ation excluding food and energy has fallen from 2.6 percent to 0.8 percent over the same period. The
Federal Reserve￿ s Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) has noted that ￿currently, the unemployment
rate is elevated, and measures of underlying in￿ ation are somewhat low, relative to levels that the Committee
judges to be consistent, over the longer run, with its dual mandate [to foster maximum employment and
price stability].￿ 2 Ordinarily, the FOMC would direct the Open Market Trading Desk at the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York to drive down short-term interest rates in this situation, in an e⁄ort to stimulate demand.
However, the FOMC￿ s main policy rate was cut to near-zero levels back in December 2008, leaving essentially
no room for further reductions. What is there left for policymakers to do, should they wish to encourage
a more rapid economic recovery? This note uses an updated version of an old analytical tool￿ the IS-LM
model￿ to shed light on possible answers to this question.3 The main conclusions are as follows:
￿ With short-term interest rates constrained by the zero bound, monetary policy￿ s only impact on the
current economy is through near-term in￿ ation expectations. Policy impedes economic recovery if it
allows these expectations to fall. It encourages recovery if it succeeds in getting these expectations to
increase. The policy challenge is to raise near-term in￿ ation expectations without eroding con￿dence in
the Federal Reserve￿ s commitment to long-term price stability.
￿ The Fed raises near-term in￿ ation expectations by either committing to maintain faster growth of its
balance sheet over an extended period or committing to a once-and-for-all upward shift in the expected
path of its balance sheet. The ￿rst option risks raising in￿ ation beyond the near term, violating the Fed￿ s
price-stability mandate.
￿ An increase in the current size of the Fed￿ s balance sheet that leaves expected future balance-sheet levels
unchanged has no impact at all, except to increase idle bank reserves and/or idle cash balances.
￿ Increases in government purchases have a greater than one-for-one e⁄ect on aggregate demand at the
zero interest-rate bound if it is believed that they will be ￿nanced through cuts in future government
purchases. Increased current purchases have an exact one-for-one e⁄ect on current demand if they are
￿nanced through a broadening of the tax base that leaves marginal tax rates unchanged. Increased
purchases have a less than one-for-one e⁄ect if it is thought that they will result in a higher future
marginal tax rate.
1. A LITTLE HISTORY OF THOUGHT
The original IS-LM macro model was developed by Sir John Hicks as a formalization of the ideas put
forward by J.M. Keynes in his General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money (Hicks 1937). Hicks￿
graphical apparatus dominated graduate and undergraduate macro textbooks well into the 1980s and is the
most frequently taught macro model at the undergraduate level even today.
At the model￿ s core are two relationships: (1) a negative relationship between current desired expendi-
ture and the real interest rate that re￿ ects the incentive to defer spending when the real return on saving is
high, for given expectations of future income or expenditure (this is the IS curve); and (2) a positive rela-
tionship between expenditure and the nominal interest rate that re￿ ects the tendency for a given quantity
of money to circulate more rapidly the higher is the opportunity cost of holding cash (this is the LM curve).
Note that it￿ s the real interest rate that matters in the IS-curve relationship and the nominal interest rate
that matters in the LM-curve relationship. For given in￿ ation expectations, though, there￿ s no problem
moving between real and nominal yields, allowing the IS and LM equations to be solved for the current level
of expenditure and the current real or nominal interest rate.
The LM relationship is relatively uncontroversial, though some people prefer to think of the Fed as
choosing the nominal interest rate rather than choosing the money supply. One simply treats the nominal
interest rate as the policy variable and solves the LM equation for the associated money supply, rather than
the other way around. A new complicating factor is that the Federal Reserve has begun paying interest on
bank reserves￿ an innovation that has a⁄ected the demand for reserves relative to cash.
The IS relationship is more problematic. Textbook expositions treat the expectations that enter the IS
equation as exogenously ￿xed, but that approach is quite limiting and unrealistic. Except at the undergrad-
1For a description of this in￿ation measure, see Dolmas (2005).
2FOMC statement released December 14, 2010.
3The approach is developed in more detail in Koenig (1993a and 1993b). A variant is applied to the Japanse economy














































                   
                       
                     
                     
                         
                       
                       
 
                         
                       
                       
                       
                     
                         
                           
                       
                           
                       
 
                         
                         
                         
                     
                         
                     
                           
                   
                       
                 
                       
                         
                       
               
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
         
               
                             
                               
         
                         
             
                               
                   
uate level, expectations are now nearly always assumed to be ￿model consistent￿or ￿rational.￿The result
is that current demand depends not just on current policy, but also on the policies that people believe will
be followed in the future. Today, these ￿feed-forward￿policy e⁄ects are of critical importance. By changing
private-sector expectations of how monetary policy will be conducted in the future, the FOMC can hope to
a⁄ect current demand despite the zero-bound constraint on the funds rate. Similarly, the extent to which
today￿ s increases in government purchases are stimulative depends very much on how people believe the
additional spending will ultimately be ￿nanced.
2. THE IS CURVE
The simplest case is an economy without capital investment.4 Then, the IS equation comes from
households￿choice between current and future consumption. Theory and intuition tell us that this decision
will be sensitive to the real interest rate:
Ect+1 ￿ ct = ￿(rt ￿ ￿); (1)
where rt is the short-term real interest rate, ct is (the logarithm of) current real consumption, Ect+1 is
planned or expected consumption next period, and ￿ and ￿ are ￿xed, positive parameters.5 (The former
parameter is called the ￿elasticity of intertemporal substitution￿and measures the sensitivity of the timing
of consumer spending to the real interest rate. The latter parameter is the ￿pure rate of time preference￿
and re￿ ects households￿tendency to prefer current over future consumption.) Equation 1 says that the
higher is the real return on saving, relative to the rate of time preference, the greater is the incentive for
households to defer consumption.
To get the equation of the IS curve, you just rearrange Equation 1 to put the real interest rate on the
left-hand side:




For given expectations of future consumption, this equation de￿nes a downward-sloping line in c ￿ r
space, with vertical intercept ￿ +
Ect+1
￿ and slope - 1
￿. Alternatively, one can write the IS equation as a
relationship between the short-term nominal interest rate and current consumption, given expected future
consumption and expected in￿ ation:




where pt is (the logarithm of) the current price level and Ept+1 is the price level expected next period.
This version of the IS curve is a downward-sloping line in c ￿ R space (Figure 1). Changes in expected
in￿ ation, E￿t+1 ￿ Ept+1￿pt, shift the line vertically, one for one (Figure 2A). Increases in expected future
consumption, Ect+1, shift the line horizontally, one for one (Figure 2B). The key to moving today￿ s IS curve
is to increase one or the other of these expectations.
4For the extension to an economy with investment, see Koenig (1993b).
5See Hall (1978). Equation 1 assumes that households are able to borrow and lend at the market interest rate. If credit
markets are impaired, some households￿spending may be constrained by current income (Campbell and Mankiw 1989). Koenig
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Figure 1: The IS curve is a negative relationship between current consumption and the nominal interest
rate.





Figure 2A: Increases in expected in￿ ation shift the IS curve vertically, one for one.


















































                   
                       
                     
                     
                         
                       
                       
 
                         
                       
                       
                       
                     
                         
                           
                       
                           
                       
 
                         
                         
                         
                     
                         
                     
                           
                   
                       
                 
                       
                         
                       
               
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
         
               
                             
                               
         
                         
             
                               
                   
Figure 2B: Increases in expected future consumption shift the IS curve horizontally, one for one.




In the special case where ￿ = 1, the IS equation reduces to
Rt = ￿ + E(pt+1 + ct+1) ￿ (pt + ct): (IS0)
Now, the IS curve has a slope of ￿1, and the only way to shift it to the right (or, equivalently, upward) is
to increase expected growth in nominal spending.
3. THE LM CURVE
How about the LM schedule? As noted above, the LM equation captures the fact that the velocity of
money is increasing in the opportunity cost of holding money. Equivalently, it captures the requirement
that the demand for base money (cash, plus bank reserves held at the Fed) equal the supply of base money.
Prior to October 2008, the cost of holding base money of all sorts was just the short-term interest rate, Rt,
because the return on holding both cash and reserves was zero. However, the Emergency Stabilization Act
of 2008, signed into law on October 3, 2008, authorized the payment of interest on noncash bank reserves
at a rate IRt ￿ Rt, set by the Board of Governors. So, now the opportunity cost of holding cash is Rt,
while the opportunity cost of holding noncash reserves is Rt ￿ IRt. With little loss of realism, suppose
that the demand for noncash reserves is zero whenever IRt < Rt and that banks are indi⁄erent as to their
noncash reserve holdings whenever IRt = Rt.6 Meanwhile, the demand for cash is positively related to (the
logarithm of) household expenditure, pt + ct, and negatively related to the nominal interest rate.
Whenever 0 ￿ IRt < Rt, only cash is demanded, and the demand for base money is equal to the supply
of base money if, and only if,
pt + ct ￿ ￿Rt = mt; (3)
where ￿ is the interest semi-elasticity of the demand for cash, pt +ct ￿Rt is the (logarithm of the) demand
for cash, and mt is (the logarithm of) the money supply. Equivalently,
pt + ct ￿ mt = ￿Rt: (30)
6In practice, banks are required to hold a minimum level of reserves that is tied to their liabilities to depositors. For
convenience, these nondiscretionary reserves are lumped together with currency and coin as ￿cash￿ in the discussion that
follows. ￿Noncash reserve holdings,￿ therefore, are reserves in excess of required reserves. Prior to the ￿nancial crisis, when
0 = IRt < Rt, these excess reserves were only 0.2 percent of base money. Thus, assuming that ￿noncash reserves￿ are
de minimis whenever the opportunity cost of holding such reserves is positive is not unrealistic. An alternative modeling
approach￿ which does not lead to conclusions substantially di⁄erent from those obtained here￿ is to assume that currency is
elastically supplied. What is referred to as ￿cash￿in the main text can then be reinterpreted as required reserves. ￿Noncash
reserve holdings￿ remain the same thing as excess reserves. Following this approach, the LM curve is those combinations of
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In words, the velocity of money is increasing in the nominal interest rate.
There are two other cases to consider: 0 < IRt = Rt and 0 = IRt = Rt. In the former case, the
opportunity cost of holding cash is positive, but that of holding bank reserves is zero. Consequently, the
demand for cash is pt+ct￿￿Rt, exactly as before, while banks are indi⁄erent as to the level of their reserves
and end up holding as excess reserves whatever portion of the money supply is not held as cash. In the
latter case (0 = IRt = Rt), the opportunity cost of holding base money of all types is zero. With banks and
households both indi⁄erent between money and short-term Treasury securities, the money supply is divided
between reserves and cash in a manner that is indeterminate.
Solving for the nominal interest rate gives the equation for the LM schedule:
Rt = maxfIRt;
pt + ct ￿ mt
￿
g: (LM)
Plotted in c ￿ R space, the LM curve has a kink (Figure 3). At low levels of consumption the LM curve is
horizontal, with Rt = IRt. At higher levels the nominal interest rate is increasing in consumption, so that
the LM schedule is upward sloping.7 An increase in the real money supply, mt ￿ pt, shifts the LM curve to
the right, one for one (Figure 4A). A cut in the interest rate on reserves, IRt, shifts the horizontal portion
of the LM curve down, one for one (Figure 4B).
Figure 3: The LM curve is a generally positive relationship between current consumption and the nominal
interest rate.





7If the Federal Reserve stands ready to lend freely to banks at discount rate DRt ￿ IRt, then arbitrage will keep
Rt ￿ DRt. Graphically, the LM curve will have a lower horizontal segment at Rt = IRt and an upper horizontal segment at
Rt = DRt and be upward sloping in between. In practice, there is a stigma attached to discount-window borrowing, so that














































                   
                       
                     
                     
                         
                       
                       
 
                         
                       
                       
                       
                     
                         
                           
                       
                           
                       
 
                         
                         
                         
                     
                         
                     
                           
                   
                       
                 
                       
                         
                       
               
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
         
               
                             
                               
         
                         
             
                               
                   
Figure 4A: Increases in the real money supply shift the LM curve horizontally, one for one.






Figure 4B: Reductions in the interest paid on reserves shift the horizontal section of the LM curve downward,
one for one.







4. IS THE MODEL CONSISTENT WITH THE DATA?
The basic idea behind the IS curve￿ speci￿cally, Equation 2￿ is that households will bid up the real
short-term interest rate if they expect times to be better in the future than they are today: Households
would all want to borrow against their future prosperity in the absence of a rate increase. Conversely,
households will bid down the real interest rate if they expect relatively bad times ahead, as they all try to
save for the coming ￿rainy day.￿There does, indeed, appear to be a strong positive relationship between real
short-term interest rates and the typical household￿ s assessment of its future prosperity relative to its current
condition. Speci￿cally, the greater is the net fraction of households expecting their incomes to rise over the
next six months, the higher tends to be the six-month Treasury bill rate, relative to trend in￿ ation. Figure
5 shows this connection in ￿rst-di⁄erence form: As the net percentage of households expecting income gains
increases, so does the six-month Treasury rate, relative to trend in￿ ation.8
8Both series trend downward in levels, which exaggerates their correlation. By taking di⁄erences, this potentially mis-
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12-month change in 3-month
moving average
Real interest rate*









1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Household 
optimism**
*6-month Treasury yield less 12-month trimmed mean PCE in￿ ation rate
** Net percentage of consumers expecting an increase in income
SOURCES: The Conference Board; Federal Reserve Board; Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas; author￿ s
calculations.
Up through the middle of 2008 there also appears to be a strong, positive relationship between changes
in the level of short-term nominal interest rates and subsequent changes in the velocity of cash, consistent
with a ￿rst-di⁄erence version of Equation 30 (Figure 6).9 In the wake of Lehman Brothers￿collapse in
September 2008, however, short-term interest rates quickly fell to negligible levels, so that households were
largely indi⁄erent as to their cash holdings. The velocity of cash collapsed. This collapse does not contradict
the IS-LM model. It merely con￿rms that the LM curve overlaps with the horizontal axis at R = 0.











12-month change in 3-month
moving average











1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Velocity**
*6-month Treasury yield shifted forward 6 months
**Velocity = (Nominal PCE)/(monetary base - excess reserves)
SOURCES: Federal Reserve Board; Bureau of Economic Analysis; author￿ s calculations.
Bottom line: The IS and LM equations match up reasonably well with relevant data.














































                   
                       
                     
                     
                         
                       
                       
 
                         
                       
                       
                       
                     
                         
                           
                       
                           
                       
 
                         
                         
                         
                     
                         
                     
                           
                   
                       
                 
                       
                         
                       
               
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
         
               
                             
                               
         
                         
             
                               
                   
5. EQUILIBRIUM
The simplest way to close the IS-LM model is to assume that prices are set one period in advance, at
levels it is believed are consistent with market clearing.10 With the current price level ￿xed, the central bank
controls the position of the LM curve through its choice of the current-period money supply and interest
paid on reserves. The expected future levels of consumption and the price level that determine the position
of the IS curve are those implied by a standard real-business-cycle model, given future monetary and ￿scal
policies. Current-period equilibrium occurs where the IS and LM schedules intersect. There are three cases
to consider.
First, the IS and LM schedules may meet along the upward-sloping portion of the LM curve (Figure
7A). In this case, anything that shifts the IS schedule upward (an increase in expected in￿ ation) or to the
right (an increase in expected future consumption) moves the economy up to the northeast along the LM
curve, raising both current consumption, ct, and the current nominal interest rate, Rt. Anything that shifts
the LM schedule to the right (an increase in the money supply) moves the economy to the southeast along
the IS curve, raising ct and lowering Rt. Changes in the interest paid on reserves, IRt, have no marginal
economic e⁄ects whatsoever.
Figure 7A: Equilibrium occurs where the IS and LM schedules intersect.










Second, the IS and LM schedules may meet along the horizontal segment of the LM curve (Figure
7B). In this case, a rightward or upward shift in the IS schedule (due to an increase in expected future
consumption or in expected in￿ ation) increases current consumption without changing the interest rate.
An expansion of the money supply shifts the LM schedule horizontally, but has no substantive marginal
economic e⁄ects at all￿ it simply increases idle bank reserves. A cut in the interest paid on reserves, by
lowering the horizontal segment of the LM curve, moves the economy to the southeast along the IS schedule,
raising current consumption and reducing the current interest rate. The exception, of course, is when the
economy begins with interest rates already at zero (Figure 7C). In these circumstances, there is no room for
further cuts in IRt, so conventional monetary policy￿ if by ￿conventional￿one means LM-curve shifts￿ is
powerless to stimulate the economy.
10￿One period￿probably corresponds to between six months and one year for the U.S. economy. For rigorous treatment
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Figure 7B: When the IS curve intersects the horizontal segment of the LM curve, changes in the current
money supply are ine⁄ective.









Figure 7C: At the zero bound, conventional monetary policy is powerless to stimulate the economy.









Between 2007:Q2 (at the eve of ￿nancial turmoil and two quarters before the peak of the business cycle)
and 2009:Q2 (the business-cycle trough), real personal consumption expenditures fell 7.1 percent relative to
trend, and short-term interest rates fell from just over 5 percent to almost zero.11 Excess reserves (bank
reserves in excess of required reserves) increased 500 fold, from 0.2 percent to 46.5 percent of the money
supply. In short, the economy moved from an equilibrium like that depicted in Figure 7A to an equilibrium
like that depicted in Figure 7C. How did this happen?
11The Congressional Budget O¢ ce, similarly, estimates that real GDP was 0.3 percent above trend in 2007:Q2 and 6.9














































                   
                       
                     
                     
                         
                       
                       
 
                         
                       
                       
                       
                     
                         
                           
                       
                           
                       
 
                         
                         
                         
                     
                         
                     
                           
                   
                       
                 
                       
                         
                       
               
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
         
               
                             
                               
         
                         
             
                               
                   
Consider, ￿rst, changes over time in expectations of future consumption. In the years leading up to
2007:Q2, one-year-ahead expected real consumption (as measured by the Survey of Professional Forecasters,
or ￿SPF￿ ) rose steadily at an average annual rate of 2.8 percent. Between 2007:Q2 and 2008:Q2, however,
these expectations fell by 0.05 percent, and between 2008:Q2 and 2009:Q2 they fell by an additional 2.37
percent. We know that changes in expected future consumption shift the IS schedule horizontally in the same
direction, one for one, so these ￿gures mean that the normal rightward drift in the IS curve was ￿rst halted,
then thrown into reverse as households became increasingly pessimistic about their prospects. Intuitively,
growing household pessimism translated into a desire to shed rather than accumulate debt, which acted to
restrain current consumption demand and put downward pressure on real interest rates.
Consider, next, changes in in￿ ation expectations. One-year-ahead SPF expectations of CPI in￿ ation
rose slightly, from 2.4 percent to 2.7 percent, between 2007:Q2 and 2008:Q2. Between 2008:Q2 and 2009:Q2,
however, one-year in￿ ation expectations reversed course and dropped to 1.7 percent (Figure 8). Changes in
in￿ ation expectations shift the IS curve vertically, one-for-one, in the same direction. So, the fall in in￿ ation
expectations that followed Lehman Brothers￿collapse shifted the IS curve downward by a full percentage
point, reinforcing the leftward shift caused by households￿increased pessimism.






SPF expected CPI inflation 





'01 '02 '03 '04 '05 '06 '07 '08 '09 '10
SPF expected CPI inflation 
rate over the next year
SOURCES: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia; author￿ s calculations.
How about the LM curve? Base-money growth slowed steadily from 9.9 percent over the four quarters
ending 2002:Q2 to 1.8 percent over the four quarters ending 2007:Q2 to 1.2 percent over the four quarters
ending 2008:Q2. Judging by Figure 6, the velocity of cash behaved pretty much as one would have expected,
given the path of short-term interest rates. The implication is that the LM schedule was shifting rightward
between 2002:Q2 and 2007:Q2, but at a slower and slower pace.
The LM-curve story over the four quarters ending 2009:Q2 was very di⁄erent. As previously mentioned,
the velocity of cash fell out of proportion to any decline in short-term interest rates following the collapse
of Lehman Brothers in 2008:Q3 as cash became a perfect substitute for short-term Treasury securities. On
the supply side, base money grew by a whopping 109.2 percent between 2008:Q2 and 2009:Q2. However,
whatever portion of the increase wasn￿ t added to holdings of cash ￿ owed into excess bank reserves (Figure
9). So, although the LM schedule shifted sharply to the right between 2008:Q2 and 2009:Q2, the vast
bulk of the shift occurred with the economy already in a situation like that depicted in Figure 7C, where
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'01 '02 '03 '04 '05 '06 '07 '08 '09 '10
Cash held outside banks
reserves
2‐2.5% Required reserves
SOURCES: Federal Reserve Board; author￿ s calculations.
7. POLICY AT THE ZERO BOUND
Increases in today￿ s money supply have no e⁄ect on real activity when the short-term interest rate is
constrained by the zero bound. Are there policies that are e⁄ective in current circumstances? Yes. First
o⁄, certain ￿scal policies are capable of providing stimulus. To see this, note that if the fraction of real GDP
purchased by the government is denoted by gt, then
yt = ct + gt; (4)
approximately, where yt is (the logarithm of) real GDP.12 With ct determined by the intersection of the IS
and LM schedules, independent of gt, it would seem that increases in government purchases as a percentage
of GDP must translate one for one into percentage increases in real GDP.13 This conclusion is correct in the
special case where the increase in gt is implemented without changes to expected future marginal tax rates
or expected future government purchases.14 Any rise in expected future marginal tax rates, however, will
lower expected future consumption, Ect+1, which will shift the current IS schedule to the left.15 With the
LM curve horizontal at the zero bound, ct will fall one for one with Ect+1, o⁄setting some of the stimulus
to GDP provided by increased government purchases. In brief, an increase in current government purchases
that people believe is to be ￿nanced through future tax-rate increases will crowd out private consumption
today, so that current output rises less than one for one with the increase in government purchases.
Suppose that people believe that the increase in gt will be ￿nanced by cuts in future government
purchases. With government purchases absorbing less of future output, Ect+1 will increase, shifting the
current IS schedule to the right by an equal amount. Thus, the positive direct e⁄ect of gt on yt is reinforced
by increased current consumption, ct. An increase in current government purchases that people believe will
be ￿nanced through cuts in future purchases has a multiplier e⁄ect on current output: Output rises by more
than one for one with the increase in government purchases. Here again, the feed-forward e⁄ect is strongest
12See the appendix for a derivation.
13For example, if gt rises from 0.21 to 0.22, then real GDP ought to rise by 100￿(0.22 - 0.21) = 1.0 percent, approximately.
Throughout this discussion, it is assumed that government purchases have no direct e⁄ects on the marginal utility derived from
consumption, leisure, or money balances.
14Most real-world e⁄orts to ￿broaden the tax base￿by eliminating deductions, credits, or exemptions push at least some
individuals into higher tax brackets and, so, have disincentive e⁄ects.
15The appendix derives how the economy will respond to various policy changes in period t + 1, when the price level has














































                   
                       
                     
                     
                         
                       
                       
 
                         
                       
                       
                       
                     
                         
                           
                       
                           
                       
 
                         
                         
                         
                     
                         
                     
                           
                   
                       
                 
                       
                         
                       
               
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
         
               
                             
                               
         
                         
             
                               
                   
when the economy is on the horizontal portion of the LM schedule, for then any horizontal shift in the IS
schedule due to a change in expected future consumption is fully re￿ ected in current consumption.16
Is there anything the monetary authority can do to provide stimulus at the zero bound? Yes, monetary
policy makers will shift the current IS curve upward, raising current consumption and output, if they can
increase expected near-term in￿ ation, E￿t+1. One way to raise expected near-term in￿ ation is by reducing
next period￿ s demand for real cash balances, which will tend to raise next period￿ s price level. This is
accomplished by committing to a sustained period of more-rapid money supply growth, so that long-term
in￿ ation expectations rise and put upward pressure on expected future nominal interest rates. (For details,
see the appendix to this article.) Another way to increase expected near-term in￿ ation is by promising an
increase in next period￿ s money supply. One rationale for Fed purchases of longer-term Treasury securities is
that such purchases may help convince the public that the FOMC intends to maintain an enlarged balance
sheet for long enough that the additional liquidity has a chance to show up in future prices.
8. COMMENTARY
A sustained period of more-rapid money growth obviously has the potential to weaken the credibility of
the Fed￿ s commitment to long-term price stability. Even a rise in near-term in￿ ation expectations above rates
considered consistent with long-term price stability is regarded as problematic by some.17 Given the current
elevated rate of unemployment and less-than-robust jobs growth prospects, however, the FOMC clearly fails
in meeting its dual mandate if it allows in￿ ation expectations to fall signi￿cantly below rates consistent with
its long-run in￿ ation objective. Survey data suggest that, indeed, it is a shortfall in in￿ ation expectations
that ought to be of concern at present, rather than any threat of an increase. Thus, after adjusting for the
normal di⁄erential between CPI and PCE in￿ ation, the 1.6 percent CPI in￿ ation expected by professional
forecasters as of 2010:Q4 (Figure 8) is roughly 0.4 percentage points below the central tendency of FOMC
participants￿stated long-run in￿ ation goals.18 Meanwhile, long-term in￿ ation expectations are well within
the range consistent with price stability and have been drifting downward, not upward (Figure 8, again).
Arguably, there are ways of communicating policy at the zero bound that would give Fed policymakers
￿ exibility to allow near-term in￿ ation expectations to increase without eroding con￿dence in the commitment
to long-term price stability. One such approach is nominal-spending targeting. Recall that when ￿ =
1 (reasonable as a rough approximation), the IS curve reduces to Equation IS0 (page 5). The key to
controlling the IS curve, in this case, is controlling expected nominal spending. In fact, with short-term
interest rates constrained by the zero bound, the only way to provide current stimulus is by increasing
expectations of future spending. The adoption of an explicit spending or spending-growth target might
positively in￿ uence these expectations. An advantage of such a target is that the amount of monetary
intervention is automatically scaled back if the real growth outlook improves￿ as might happen, for example,
in response to ￿scal stimulus. If the real growth outlook deteriorates, however, monetary policy makers have
license to pursue higher in￿ ation in the near term. At all times, long-term in￿ ation expectations are anchored
by the di⁄erence between target spending growth and the economy￿ s long-term real growth potential.
16These results on ￿scal multiplier and crowding-out e⁄ects take expected near-term in￿ation as given. The situation is
rather more complicated if, instead, one takes the expected future money supply as given. See the appendix for details.
17Based on such concerns, the European Central Bank at all times seeks to keep in￿ation close to its 2.0 percent long-run
goal, without allowing it to exceed that goal.
18Four times per year, each FOMC participant reveals the PCE in￿ation rate that he or she believe is most consistent,
over the long term, with the Federal Reserve￿ s mandate. As of November 2010, the central tendency of these rates extended
from 1.6 to 2.0 percent. (The central tendency excludes the three highest and three lowest responses.) However, PCE in￿ation
runs between 40 and 50 basis points below CPI in￿ation on average, over the long term. So, if the normal di⁄erential holds,
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APPENDIX: The Flexible-Price Equilibrium and ￿Feed-Forward￿E⁄ects on Today￿ s Economy
This appendix derives the equilibrium of a competitive economy with ￿ exible wages and prices. In the
absence of new shocks, it is this equilibrium that the economy described in the body of this paper will
achieve once wages and prices have had a chance to adjust. Accordingly, under rational expectations it is
also this equilibrium that governs the ￿next-period￿expectations of households in the IS-LM model. For
convenience, the functions that characterize technology and tastes are chosen so that utility-maximization,
pro￿t-maximization, and other equilibrium conditions are all linear in logarithms. However, the important
results go through, qualitatively, under much less stringent conditions. (Chie￿ y, leisure and consumption
must be ￿normal￿goods, and the utility function of the representative household must be separable, in each
period, between consumption, leisure, and real cash balances.)
The Real Economy. Much as in Koenig (1996), the production function of the representative ￿rm is





where Y and N are output per person and labor-hours per person, respectively, 0 ￿ ￿ < 1 is a ￿xed
parameter, and ￿ > 0 is an exogenously varying productivity variable. Taking logarithms:
y = ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)n ￿ ln(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ + ￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)n; (A.2)
where y ￿ ln(Y ), ￿ ￿ ln(￿), and n ￿ ln(N). The approximation is accurate for realistically small values of
￿. Pro￿t maximization implies that the ￿rm will demand labor up to the point where the marginal product
of labor equals the real wage:
￿ ￿ ￿n = w ￿ p; (A.3)
where w and p are the logarithms of the wage rate and price level, respectively. Equation A.3 de￿nes a
downward-sloping labor demand schedule with vertical intercept ￿ and slope ￿￿.










where C is consumption, ￿ > 0 is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, and ￿ > 0 is a ￿xed para-
meter. Utility maximization implies (among other things) that the marginal rate of substitution between




= w ￿ p + ln(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ w ￿ p ￿ ￿; (A.5)
where the approximation is accurate provided that the tax rate applicable to labor income, ￿, is not too
large. Importantly, Equation A.5 is derived assuming that the individual takes the tax rate as ￿given￿in
much the same way that it takes the wage rate and price level as given.
Finally, the economy is subject to a resource constraint:
C = Y (1 ￿ g); (A.6)
where g ￿ G
Y is the fraction of output consumed by the government. Taking logarithms:
c = y + ln(1 ￿ g) ￿ y ￿ g: (A.7)
The approximation is accurate provided g is not too large. The analysis that follows treats g as an exogenous
￿scal-policy variable, so that government purchases per person are proportional to output per person. It is
important that government purchases per person depend on the economy-wide average of output per person,
so that the labor-supply decision of any one household has a negligible e⁄ect on G.
Equations A.2, A.3, A.5 and A.7 are readily solved for the equilibrium values of output, labor hours,
consumption, and the real wage as functions of productivity, the tax rate, and the fraction of output
purchased by the government:
y￿ =
(1 + ￿)￿ + (1 ￿ ￿) g
















































                   
                       
                     
                     
                         
                       
                       
 
                         
                       
                       
                       
                     
                         
                           
                       
                           
                       
 
                         
                         
                         
                     
                         
                     
                           
                   
                       
                 
                       
                         
                       
               
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
         
               
                             
                               
         
                         
             
                               









(1 + ￿)￿ ￿ (￿ + ￿)g + (￿ + ￿)￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿
￿
(A.10)
(w ￿ p)￿ =
( 1










For the purposes of this paper, what￿ s important is that equilibrium consumption is decreasing in both the
fraction of output purchased by the government and the tax rate. If, in period t, people expect markets will
clear in t + 1, then:
Ect+1 = Ec￿
t+1 =
E[(1 + ￿)￿t+1 ￿ (￿ + ￿)gt+1 + (￿ + ￿)￿ ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)￿t+1]
￿
: (A.13)
Hence, given near-term in￿ ation expectations, the period-t IS curve will shift to the right in response to
expected higher future productivity, smaller government, or a lower tax rate￿ precisely as claimed in our
discussion of the feed-forward e⁄ects of alternative methods for ￿nancing ￿scal stimulus.
The Future Price Level. As discussed in the main text, monetary policy makers can a⁄ect the short-
run (￿xed-price) equilibrium of the economy at the zero bound if they can change people￿ s perceptions of
what the price level will be once it has had a chance to adjust: the higher is the expected future price level
relative to the current (￿xed) price level, the higher is today￿ s IS curve, and the greater are today￿ s output,
consumption, and employment.
For simplicity, suppose that consumption is expected to grow at a constant rate, ￿￿, once the price level
has become ￿ exible, and that the money supply is expected to grow steadily at rate ￿￿. Equations 2 and 3
imply that19






















Combining A.15 and A.16:




which has a unique nonexplosive solution:
￿￿ = ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿: (A.18)
In words, in￿ ation equals the di⁄erence between money growth and real output growth. It follows that the
equilibrium nominal interest rate must be:




Note that the zero bound is not an issue provided that R￿ > 0, which the monetary authority can always
achieve by choosing a su¢ ciently high rate of money growth, ￿￿.
The position of the period-t IS curve, we know, is in￿ uenced by expected in￿ ation, which is determined
by the price level expected next period, Ept+1. Using Equations 3 and A.19, if people believe that markets
will clear in t + 1, then
Ept+1 = E[mt+1 ￿ c￿
t+1 + ￿R￿] = Efmt+1 ￿ c￿
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For given expectations of future productivity, E￿t+1, and future ￿scal policy, Egt+1 and E￿t+1 ￿ which
together determine Ec￿
t+1 ￿ the monetary authority can increase expected in￿ ation and, hence, shift the
period-t IS schedule upward by increasing either the expected future money supply, Emt+1, or expected
future money growth, E￿￿. The latter policy has the disadvantage that it raises expected long-term in￿ ation,
E￿￿ (c.f. Equation A.18). This disadvantage is made clear if A.18 and A.20 are combined to yield:
Ept+1 = E[mt+1 ￿ c￿




The import of Equation A.200 is that if monetary policy makers want to help the economy today without
jeopardizing long-run price stability, they must increase Emt+1 relative to Ec￿
t+1.
An Alternative View of Policy. The above analysis follows the main text in assuming that the monetary
authority targets the expected future price level (Ept+1) and expected long-run in￿ ation (￿￿). An alternative
approach has the monetary authority target the expected future size of its balance sheet (Emt+1) and ￿￿.
From Equations A.10 and A.200, an implication of this approach is that the ￿scal authority, through its
budget decisions (speci￿cally, through its in￿ uence on Egt+1 and E￿t+1 and, hence, on Ec￿
t+1) has as
much control over the expected future price level as does the monetary authority. In return, the monetary
authority becomes the dominant in￿ uence on current household demand. To see this, recall that shifting
the IS curve is the only way to stimulate household demand when monetary policy is constrained by the
zero bound. In turn, the only way to shift the IS curve is by changing E[pt+1 +
ct+1













For a given expected money supply and given long-run in￿ ation target, the impact of changes in expected
consumption￿ and, hence, of changes in expected ￿scal policy￿ is ambiguous. In the special case where ￿
= 1, the current position of the IS curve is completely independent of current or future ￿scal policy. (The
exception: If there are government tax and/or spending and/or regulatory policies that raise the economy￿ s
long-run real growth rate, ￿￿, these will feed forward and shift the IS schedule rightward.) Of course, even
if its in￿ uence on current household demand is suspect, the ￿scal authority still directly in￿ uences current
aggregate economic activity through its control of government purchases, gt.
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